Rejoinder to Keller and Spicer by NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University & Strickland, Ruth Ann
Marcia Lynn Whicker, Ruth Ann Strickland and Dorothy Olshfski. (1996). "Rejoinder to Keller 
and Spicer." Public Administration Review 56 (November/December, no. 6): 614-615. [also 
reprinted in 1997] (ISSN: 0033-3352) Wiley-Blackwell [The definitive version is available at 
www3.interscience.wiley.com] 
 
Rejoinder to Keller and Spicer 
Marcia Lynn Whicker, Ruth Ann Strickland and Dorothy Olshfski 
 
ABSTRACT 
The article presents the authors' response to a critique of an article that levied several criticisms 
arguing for stronger links between political science and public administration. In their 
commentary on our article, Keller and Spicer levied four criticisms arguing for stronger links 
between political science and public administration. The approaches Keller and Spicer do 
espouse are not contradictory with viewing government as a system, and, indeed, complement 
such a view. Nothing inherent in a systems framework contends that administrators cannot take 
an activist role, as Carl Friedrich (1940), George Frederickson (1971), and John Rohr (1986) 
argue they should, for arguing that government converts inputs into policy outputs does not 
necessarily specify the role of public administrators in that conversion. Another old but still 
useful concept in political science--that of the iron triangle--sees bureaucrats as activist and 
astutely forming a political coalition with members of key subcommittees in the U.S. Congress 
as well as relevant interest groups to garner more resources for their agency and its mission. 
 
ARTICLE 
In their commentary on our article, Keller and Spicer levied four criticisms arguing for 
stronger links between political science and public administration [PAR, Nov/Dec 1993). They 
said that we have (1) an old fashioned "instrumental" view of both fields that views government 
as a conversion process, (2) veered toward "technism" with an over-emphasis on positivism and 
a de-emphasis on other kinds of knowledge, (3) ignored the role of values in public 
administration, and (4) too broadly construed political science to include public choice, agency 
theory, and organization theory. We respond. 
 
 
1. Government as a conversion process. 
 
We are critiqued for using David Easton's systems notion (1953) that views politics as a 
system, with government playing an integral conversion role within it. That this view of politics 
and government is old, dating from the fifties, does not make it old-fashioned. Some old things, 
including conceptual frameworks, stand the test of time and become classics, guiding further 
inquiry in both subtle and nonsubtle ways. Critics who argue that an existing paradigm is truly 
outdated must at least acknowledge the need for a replacement, and ideally present one. But no 
such competing paradigm is presented, or even mentioned. 
 
The approaches Keller and Spicer do espouse are not contradictor)' with viewing 
government as a system, and, indeed, complement such a view. Nothing inherent in a systems 
framework contends that administrators cannot take an activist role, as Carl Friedrich (1940), 
George Frederickson (1971), and John Rohr (1986) argue they should, for arguing that 
government converts inputs into policy outputs does not necessarily specify the role of public 
administrators in that conversion. Another old but still useful concept in political science—that 
of the iron triangle—-sees bureaucrats as activist and astutely forming a political coalition with 
members of key subcommittees in Congress as well as relevant  interest groups to garner more 
resources  for their agency and its mission. 
 
Principal agent theory, which Keller and Spicer embrace, examines some very specific 
notions about the power of Congress to check bureaucrats in that conversion process: Do 
bureaucrats act as agents, and if so, of whom? Is Congress the principal and what control does 
Congress exert over bureaucrats' behavior? These questions flesh out systems theory, examining 
a key interaction within the political system, rather than contradict it by espousing a new 
paradigm. Indeed, implicit in principal agent theory, not systems theory, is the passive agent role 
for bureaucrats responding external principals that so concerns Keller and Spicer. 
 
Further, they, not we, make the analogy that this conversion of private sector economic 
resources into public goods and services resembles an efficient engine. The question of 
mechanistic efficiency is separate from a framework that acknowledges one of the most 
important flows of inputs and outputs in the economy, and notes that the flow is political as well 
as economic. The inability to measure and. prove efficiency at the organizational level, because 
of the inability to place a legitimate dollar value on government outputs from their nature as 
public goods, is the bane of present bureaucrats, leaving them open to antigovernment public 
sentiments, negative caricatures of public employees, and meat-cleaver approaches to funding 
issues. If this aspect of Keller and Spicer's criticism were only true, the life of virtually every 
public employee would be much improved. And in making the analogy to an engine, we attribute 
a major role— hardly passivity and neutrality—to the bureaucracy, precisely the opposite of 
what Keller and Spicer imply we do. 
 
. 
2. Ignoring nonpositivist forms of knowledge.  
 
We did argue for more rigorous quantitative training and contended that political science 
historically has offered that to a greater extent than public administration. Yet rigorous 
quantitative training is not the same thing as positivism and empirical technique^: nor did we say 
it was. Historically, rigorous  quantitative methods came first to positivism within political 
science, but now the field is embracing more rigorous theory building techniques as well, 
especially set theory mathematics, linear and matrix  algebra, calculus, and the mathematics of 
inequalities in applications of game theory and public choice to political phenomena. 
Subfields within political science have also on occasion used simulations, which are rigorous and 
quantitative, and may or may not be empirical (see Stoll, 1983; Sigelman and Dometrius, 1986; 
Cohen, 1984; and Whicker and Mauet, 1983). Perhaps we should have been clearer: Our 
argument for more rigorous quantitative training provided within political science includes 
rigorous theory building approaches as well as statistical empirical techniques. 
 
As for the role of case studies, we do not deny their contributions, especially in teaching, 
but rather we contend that case studies alone do not a theory make, or even a framework. Case 
studies have the greatest impact upon a field in it.'; infancy, when paradigms are being sought; or 
occasionally later in the development of a field, when contradictions so theory show its 
weaknesses. Had, for example, someone written an important case study of the conflicts between 
the Soviet Union and The People's Republic of China in the 1950s, our "domino theory" of 
foreign relations and the assumption of monolithic communism that ir was built upon might have 
crumbled in. time to prevent U.S. escalation in Vietnam. But such a case study might have been 
written and ignored, precisely because it was a case study and therefore subject to tor. Case 
studies have a role in science, but as the science becomes developmentally mature, the role 
shrinks from a leading one to a bit part. 
 
 
3. Ignoring values in public administration. 
 
No scholar is immune from the influence of his or her value system, nor would the world 
necessarily be better off if that were the case. But, simplifying, values can have two different 
impacts: (1) they can shape how one interprets data., events, outcomes, and facts, the 
methodology of science; and (2) they can define what are appropriate areas of inquiry—the 
substance of science. We argue for minimizing the former, but acknowledge that even rigorous 
quantitative techniques only go so far toward this end. Two scholars, however, one liberal and 
one conservative (or any other salient distinction), both viewing the same set of events and 
outcomes, should agree on a description of tbose events. If they do not, due to incompatible 
frameworks, they should at least be aware that their differences in description arise as much from 
their own cognitive approaches as from the events themselves, and bow their frameworks 
produce disagreement. 
 
Nowhere, however, do we contend that values should not help define the substance of 
Science. In fact, we argue the reverse: that the values embraced as "dependent variables" within 
political science—power, justice, conflict management and reduction, and redistributive 
policies—are legitimate and useful values to guide scholarly inquiry within public 
administration. 
 
 
4. Including public choice, agency theory, and, organization theory in political science. 
 
Perhaps Keller and Spicer have a legitimate bone to pick with |us here by noting that we 
have claimed political science embraces public choice, agency theory, and organization theory, 
when these fields were grounded in economics, sociology, and psychology. But it is a small 
bone, and we are glad they pick at it with appropriate levity. .After all, a political figure, John E 
Kennedy, noted success bas many fathers while failure is an orphan, so for political science to 
claim these areas bespeaks their success. An even older writer and observer of political events, 
Aristotle, did claim that the study of politics is the queen of the sciences. But in the free-
wheeling interdisciplinary futuristic academy, perhaps where ideas are generated will be less 
important than who does what, where, why, and how with them— the guts of what politics is all 
about. 
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